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 The purpose of this analysis is to shed light on the relationship between large-
scale economic investment and crime in Washington, DC neighborhood clusters (N=39) 
from 2001 to 2007. Using panel data and a two-way fixed effects analytic strategy, results 
indicate that investment in large scale economic development projects (in millions of 
dollars) and crime rates (per 1,000) are inversely related controlling for disadvantage and 
time effects. Further analyses indicate that the relationship is dependent on a number of 
investment related factors, including major use of investment project (e.g. industrial, 
retail), financing source (public versus private), construction type (new versus 
renovation), as well as outcome variable (i.e. violent versus property crime). Residential 
investment has the strongest and most consistent relationship with both violent and 
property crime suggesting that the changes which accompany residential investment may 
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Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Two perspectives have traditionally informed scholarship on the causes of crime. 
Theories that fall under a micro level perspective view crime in terms of individual 
action, and focus on decision-making, biosocial factors, and social-psychological 
processes that contribute to criminal behavior. Macro level theories, on the other hand, 
focus on different aggregates of people or places and are concerned with the structural 
and cultural factors that organize groups and the mechanisms that lead some to have 
higher levels of criminal events than others. Ecological theories, for example, seek to 
explain how crime rates vary by space and time by studying different geographic 
aggregates of individuals, such as neighborhoods. This latter perspective – one which 
emphasizes place – is not only salient for understanding crime, but social organization 
and inequality in general. Neighborhood of residence, for example, consistently stratifies 
access to health care, education, and jobs, as well as exposure to crime, poverty, and 
other social dislocations (Squires and Kubrin, 2005). Metropolitan areas in particular are 
characterized by geographically structured inequalities that intersect racial and class 
identities. High crime areas, for example, are typically dense urban neighborhoods of 
concentrated disadvantage, characterized by factors including: unemployment and overall 
low socio-economic status, racial and ethnic heterogeneity1, residential mobility and 
                                               
1Racial composition may play a more important role than racial or ethnic heterogeneity per se. For 
example, highly homogenous Black/African-American neighborhoods tend to have high rates of violence 
and homicide (Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994). There is strong evidence to attribute this correlation to the 
higher levels of concentrated disadvantage in neighborhoods that are predominantly Black. As Sampson 
and Wilson (1995:45) note: “…racial differences in poverty and family disruption are so strong that the 
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population instability, family disruption, social and physical disorder, and mixed land use 
patterns (Stark, 1987; Sampson, 2006). Much like people, places such as those above can 
be characterized by criminality. As Reiss argues, “our sense of personal safety and 
potential victimization by crime is shaped less by knowledge of specific criminals than it 
is by knowledge of dangerous and safe places and communities (1986:1).” Simply put, 
understanding place is vital to understanding crime. 
Given the prominent role of place in criminology, a practical question emerges: 
what happens when places change? Metropolitan areas have experienced a number of 
recent phenomena – particularly since the middle of the century – that may be relevant to 
the macro level understanding of crime, including suburbanization, immigration, and 
gentrification (Wilson 1987; MacDonald, 1986). Criminologists have called for further 
examinations of community change and crime (Kirk and Laub, forthcoming; Kubrin and 
Weitzer, 2003; Reiss, 1986). Despite this, few criminological investigations have focused 
on the process by which neighborhoods become high or low crime areas (Schuerman and 
Kobrin, 1986). Likewise, few research studies have examined the relationship between 
crime and contemporary urban change. The impact of disinvestment and decline, for 
example, has been well documented in the criminological literature (Skogan, 1986; 
Schuerman and Kobrin, 1986), but reverse processes such as reinvestment and renewal 
are less understood. 
Many urban neighborhoods across the United States have undergone significant 
amounts of reinvestment within the last decades. For example once disadvantaged 
neighborhoods in Bronzeville, Chicago and Harlem, New York have slowly begun to 
                                                                                                                                            




transform from areas of urban neglect to those of reinvestment and renewal (Hyra, 2008). 
Investment varies according to both magnitude and kind– from small scale renovations of 
single family homes in the form of “gentrification,” to large scale development of mixed-
use, multi-unit buildings (Harcourt, 2004; Kennedy and Leonard, 2001). Reinvestment in 
urban communities has the potential to reshape the physical and social landscape. Many 
changes brought about by investment are striking when juxtaposed with previous decades 
of accumulated poverty and decay, much of which was facilitated by middle class 
migration to the suburbs, job loss due to deindustrialization, and urban riots fueled by 
racial and class tensions (Sampson, 1987; Wilson, 1987). 
Like these historic forces that contributed to the earlier decline of urban 
neighborhoods, contemporary structural factors, such as the rise of the global economy, 
have engendered a recent revival of urban America (Hyra, 2008). Both logic and 
evidence suggest that these factors will correspond with a myriad of changes in urban 
neighborhoods, including the purposes they are used for (i.e. for work, home, shopping, 
or recreation) and the people they are used by. Research by Hyra (2008) has shown how 
cities as diverse as Chicago and New York have experienced similar types of change in 
the last decade, such as an increase in the number of white collar jobs and residents, 
changes in public housing2, and renewed interest in investment in inner-city 
neighborhoods by businesses and private developers. These changes in land use and 
population have important implications for indicators of community well-being, such as 
crime. 
                                               
2 Hyra (2008) describes how changes in public housing policy in New York City and Chicago varied in the 
nineties. For example, in Chicago, mismanagement of public housing led to the necessary demolition of 
high rise housing projects, displacement of former tenants, and investment in the surrounding real estate. In 
New York City, tenants maintained much more control of the management and, as a consequence, did not 
experience the same levels of displacement despite redevelopment. 
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Crime is commonly considered an urban problem (Shaw and McKay, 1942). As 
urban areas undergo transformations, the geographic distribution of crime comes into 
question. Though crime began to drop in many cities in the mid nineties (Blumstein and 
Wallman, 2006), it is unclear if ecological changes contributed to this.3 Evidence that 
there is considerable variation in crime trends once units of analysis are disaggregated 
suggests the importance of examining micro-level (i.e. within-city) processes, particularly 
those at the neighborhood level (Weisburd, Bushway, Lum, and Yang, 2004). 
Despite a strong theoretical tradition of ecological research in criminology (Shaw 
and McKay, 1942; Sampson, 2006; Bursik and Grasmick, 1993), little is known about the 
impact of different kinds of urban change on crime in the short and long term (Kirk and 
Laub, forthcoming). Given that some cities are undergoing both increases in investment 
and reductions in crime, it is surprising that few researchers have turned the 
criminological lens on this relationship. Answers to these questions are important not 
only for urban policy, but also for criminological theory. There is a dearth of research 
that tests if and how these types of neighborhood change affect crime (Bursik, 1989). In 
addition, studies that do focus on the relationship between ecological factors and crime 
have often failed to capture the dynamic nature of neighborhoods, often having to make 
do with cross-sectional data to answer research questions that are implicitly concerned 
with change. The following research will attempt to fill in these gaps in the literature by 
exploring the relationship between one contemporary aspect of urban change – local 
large-scale economic investment – and crime, across units of space and time. 
                                               
3 Scholars have suggested that many factors, including the changing age structure of the population, 





The metropolitan area of Washington, DC, which includes suburban Virginia and 
Maryland, is home to over five million people, over half a million of whom live inside 
the city’s borders (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009). After several decades of malaise, 
Washington, DC has experienced a number of short term trends indicative of the broader 
renewal undergoing the city (Urban Institute, 2008). Increases in population, racial and 
ethnic diversity, employment, income, home values, and home sales are all signals that 
the city may be emerging from the blight that characterized much of the latter half of the 
twentieth century. Population counts from the decennial Census demonstrate the dramatic 
exodus that occurred in Washington between 1950 and 2000 (Urban Institute, 2008). 
From a zenith of over 800,000 residents in 1950, the population declined by nearly 30 
percent over fifty years to 572,059 in 2000. Estimates for 2008, indicate that the city may 
finally be experiencing a population increase, having risen by a slight three percent to 
591,833 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2009)4. Since 1990, the proportion of White, Hispanic, and 
Asian residents has increased, while the proportion of Black residents has declined. 
Though overall population was dropping between 1990 and 2000, the share of Whites 
increased from 27.4 to 28.1 percent of the population and the share of Hispanics 
increased from 5.4 to 7.9 percent of the population; conversely, the share of Blacks 
decreased from 65.1 to 60.5 percent (U.S. Census Bureau, 2001). These trends have 
continued into the new millennium. According to the American Community Survey (U.S. 
Census Bureau, 2009) estimates for 2005-2007, Blacks currently constitute 55.4 percent 
of the population, Whites constitute 34.4 percent, and Hispanics constitute 8.3 percent. 
                                               
4 Though many cities have experienced population stabilization or growth relative to the last fifty years, 
many cities continue to lose population. Further, growth in suburban areas considerably outpaces these 
recent trends (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). 
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In general, the economic status of the District of Columbia has improved since the 
nineties. The local economy has benefited from an influx in white collar and service jobs, 
particularly in the hospitality, international finance, business services, and information 
technology industries; a large contributor to the boost in jobs is the rise in federal 
government contracting with private firms (Urban Institute, 2008). Labor force and 
employment have risen consistently since the late nineties, a reflection of the growing 
population base. Unemployment rates, though more variable, have improved since the 
nineties – declining between 1998 and 2000 and 2004 and 2007 (U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, 2009). Poverty, though also variable, has declined since 2000. Finally, though 
median income fell between 1990 and 2000, estimates for 2005-07 from the ACS show 
an increase (Urban Institute, 2008). 
Both economic and population growth in the new millennium have coincided with 
an explosion in the housing market relative to the eighties and nineties. This is evident 
when examining a number of different housing market indicators. Home sales increased 
by 20 percent between 2000 and 2004 and condominium sales increased 123 percent 
between 2000 and 2005, before slowing down in the last few years. The value of single 
family homes increased approximately 13 percent each year between 2000 and 2007 and 
the value of condominiums increased 12 percent annually for the same time series. In less 
than ten years, the number of mortgage loans doubled. High income homebuyers make 
up a greater share of overall homebuyers. Finally, the number of owner-occupied units 
declined (Urban Institute, 2008). Taken altogether, the data suggest that the increasing 
demand and value of real estate in Washington, DC is driven by higher-income home-
buyers and real estate investors, most likely in part due to the recent economic 
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improvements in the region. In 2008, the Washington Business Journal reported that 
Washington, DC was the second most popular real estate market in the world for 
international investors (Killian, 2008). 
Finally, like many cities across the country, the city has seen a decline in crime 
since the mid-nineties. Homicides, for example, have declined consistently since the early 
nineties. In 1993, the city saw 454 homicides; by 2005 that number had dropped to 196 
(Metropolitan Police Department, 2009). In general, total crimes declined by 
approximately 50 percent between 1993 and 2005. The same pattern is true for most 
other Index crimes5. Though part of the drop in the raw number of crimes may be 
accounted for by the continuing population loss of the nineties, crime has continued to 
drop in the new millennium when the population decline began to turn around. 
Despite such changes in the socio-demographic character and economic well-
being of the District as a whole, there is considerable variation within the city. Over half 
of all neighborhood clusters have experienced population loss since 2000 (Urban 
Institute, 2008). Despite increased racial and ethnic diversity, it is not clear whether in or 
out migration has contributed to residential segregation or income inequality between 
racial and ethnic groups. Though economic conditions have improved the overall 
standing of the city, it is unclear whether this is caused by migration of new residents to 
the city or improved economic conditions benefiting existing residents. Regardless, a 
number of neighborhoods have high rates of unemployment and median incomes below 
the poverty line. In light of rising values in the real estate market, affordable housing 
remains a critical concern. Although Washington no longer holds the title of “murder 
                                               
5 Aggravated assaults and larceny-thefts experienced even more dramatic drops, declining by 
approximately 60 and 70 percents respectively. Arsons dropped by approximately 7 percent. 
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capital” of the nation, it remains characterized by high crime and violence. In 2007, for 
example, the city recorded 181 homicides. Cities of comparable population – such as 
Milwaukee, Nashville, Boston, and Seattle – experienced considerably less: 105, 73, 65, 
and 24 homicides respectively. Finally, it is important to note that these disparities are 
geographically structured, with higher rates of disadvantage (i.e. crime, poverty, and 
population loss) particularly pronounced in neighborhoods on the east half of the city and 
in the city’s Ward 8. 
In sum, while the District has experienced uplift, there is much variation in where 
these changes are manifested. Given the overlap between these phenomena – in and out 
migration, economic improvement, a robust real estate market, and the crime drop – it is 
natural to ask if and how these changes are related. For example, is the in-migration of 
Whites and out-migration of Blacks related to changes in the local economy? Are 
changes in the real estate market related to community crime levels? The growth of large 
scale projects in many parts of the city has been noticeable at the neighborhood level. 
Though local economic investment appears to impact neighborhoods at a superficial 
level, as evidenced by the plethora of new and renovated buildings that have emerged in 
place of once-abandoned and dilapidated blocks, it is unclear if this has had any 
meaningful effect on the community. Specifically, it is unclear if investment of this 
nature has reduced crime and increased safety for neighborhood residents and visitors. 
The goal of this study is to answer four main questions: 1) What is known about 
investment in neighborhood clusters between 2001 and 2006? 2) Is overall investment in 
neighborhood clusters related to crime? 3) How does the relationship between investment 
and crime fare when investment is disaggregated according to the major use of the 
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project? 4) Finally, is the relationship between investment – both overall and specific 
types – the same for violent and property crime rates? The descriptive and aggregate 
analysis will conclude with a descriptive within-neighborhood cluster examination of 
several areas of the city that have experienced change. 
In order to do this, I utilize two sources that feature data on local economic 
investment and crime in Washington, DC neighborhood clusters in the first several years 
of the twenty-first century. The Washington, DC Economic Partnership (WDCEP) 
provides data on large-scale investment projects in the District of Columbia. The Urban 
Institute’s Neighborhood Info DC database provides data on aggregate crime, as well as 
other relevant community-level indicators (e.g. disadvantage). The following analysis, 
utilizing a panel data-set constructed from these two sources, will provide insight into the 








Chapter 2:  Theoretical Framework 
 
 
 The concept of place is central to the intellectual history of criminological 
thought. Theorists have been examining the relationship between ecological factors and 
crime since the 18th century (Levin and Lindesmith, 1937). The processes of 
urbanization, industrialization, and immigration provided the context for the concept of 
anomie – a lack of norms and breakdown in social control caused by rapid social change. 
Similar historical forces that characterized early twentieth century neighborhoods of 
Chicago were salient factors in Clifford Shaw and Henry McKay’s research on 
neighborhood change and juvenile delinquency (Shaw and McKay, 1942). Their 
discovery that crime persisted in structurally disadvantaged neighborhoods (i.e. zones of 
transition) despite turnovers in population challenged xenophobic explanations of crime 
and led to their social disorganization thesis. They argued that neighborhood structural 
factors – specifically poverty, residential turnover, and ethnic heterogeneity – led to a 
breakdown in neighborhood social control, which then led to crime. Though lacking 
adequate measures to empirically test this particular assertion, their research laid the 
foundation for a number of different hypotheses about the ecological distribution of 
crime, neighborhood level social control, and cultural facilitation of crime (Sampson and 
Groves, 1989). 
Later research that attempted to test Shaw and McKay’s work supported the 
notion that social disorganization (measured as local friendship networks, control of 
street youth, and participation in organizations) was responsible for mediating the 
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relationship between structural factors and crime (Sampson and Groves, 1989). 
Contemporary research has moved beyond an interpretation of social disorganization 
based merely on social ties to conceptualizations that account for the normative aspect of 
neighborhood social control. The concept of collective efficacy, which is defined as 
“social cohesion” combined with “shared expectations” for control envelops both 
structural elements – social networks – and cultural elements – shared understandings of 
residents (Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls, 1997; Sampson, 2006). 
Research from the latter half of the twentieth century has shown that different 
historical processes, such as Black urban migration, suburban flight, urban 
deindustrialization, and gentrification have had an impact on the distribution and 
character of crime (Morenoff and Sampson, 1997). Bursik and Webb (1982) analyze the 
relationship between juvenile delinquency and four types of structural change in Chicago 
neighborhoods – population size, percent foreign born whites, percent non whites, and 
household density – for census years from 1940 to 1970. They find that, although Shaw 
and McKay’s basic thesis is confirmed in the earliest period (1940-50) – that is, that 
delinquency is geographically stable despite change - change from 1950-60 and 1960-70 
is associated with change in delinquency. Additional analyses indicate that 
neighborhoods with more rapidly increasing proportions of nonwhites had higher rates of 
delinquency, which the authors attribute to the rapidly increasing migration of Blacks to 
the inner city during these eras. In other words, different historical forces have important 
implications for neighborhood change: as the authors note, “it is the nature of change that 
is related to delinquency rather than the groups involved (Bursik and Webb, 1982: 39).” 
Findings such as these challenge theoretical arguments derived from cross-sectional data 
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and underscore the importance of examining socio-historical impacts on social processes. 
Other studies have examined the impact that increasingly greater concentrations of 
disadvantage – attributed to forces such as middle class migration to the suburbs and 
urban deindustrialization - have had on crime. Taylor and Covington (1988) find that 
relative reductions in status and stability in “underclass” Baltimore neighborhoods are 
associated with increases in murder and aggravated assaults, further underscoring the 
importance of examining different types of neighborhood change and the factors that 
precede them. Finally, Schuerman and Kobrin (1986) examine the development of high 
crime census tract spatial clusters from 1950-70 in Los Angeles County, identifying 
“emerging,” “transitional,” and “enduring” crime areas. They find that a number of 
structural factors related to land-use, socio-demographic characteristics, and economic 
variables converged over the span of twenty years, characterizing a process of gradual 
abandonment, disinvestment, and concentrated disadvantage. 
Despite a rich literature on the relationship between neighborhood-level structural 
factors, ecological change, and crime, few have examined the relatively recent 
phenomenon of urban renewal and none have examined the consequences of large-scale 
economic investment. A handful of studies have examined a related phenomenon – 
gentrification – which began to emerge in the 1970s (McDonald, 1986; Taylor and 
Covington, 1988; Covington and Taylor, 1989). Gentrification is typically conceptualized 
as a process whereby middle and upper class residents buy into the affordable housing 
stock in lower income neighborhoods, displacing existing residents and driving up 
property values. Using a qualitative approach to identify fourteen gentrifying 
neighborhoods in five American cities, McDonald (1986) found that, relative to the city 
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as a whole, gentrifying neighborhoods had modest to significantly decreasing rates of 
violent crime, but little to no change in rates of property crime from 1970 to 1984.  
McDonald’s examination of gentrification provides not only an important glimpse 
of changing neighborhoods in diverse city contexts but also highlights several potential 
explanations for the relationship between gentrification and crime, many of which could 
apply to the related phenomenon of large scale economic investment. First, he posits that 
gentrification may reduce crime via its replacement of lower income residents with 
middle to upper income residents. According to this demographic argument, the selective 
out-migration of lower-income residents – who tend to have higher rates of both 
victimization and offending – combined with the selective in-migration of higher income 
residents may simply reduce crime because areas characterized by more affluent residents 
tend to have lower rates of crime. McDonald points out that this may also have a 
displacement effect on other neighborhoods, or even a retaliatory effect on the 
gentrifying neighborhoods themselves if middle to upper income residents become 
attractive targets for victimization. Second, McDonald makes the argument that the 
changing physical appearance of neighborhoods may reduce crime by reducing disorder. 
Though the empirical status of the “broken windows” thesis is debatable (Sampson and 
Raudenbush, 1999; Sampson and Raudenbush, 2004), it is possible that reductions in 
disorder may play a causal role in the reduction of crime. Third, McDonald seems to 
make the argument that gentrifying neighborhoods may reduce crime through its effect 
on social organization if efforts are made by residential newcomers to control crime. If 
residents are effective at establishing social networks and shared understandings 
regarding neighborhood social control it is possible that neighborhood crime will be 
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thwarted. In addition, McDonald notes that incoming residents may have a greater ability 
at accessing formal social control agents (e.g. the police). While these residents may be 
more politically connected because of their privileged racial or class positions, and 
therefore more capable of demanding formal social control, they may also be more 
trusting of agents of formal social control and thus more likely to call upon police and 
other authorities. Finally, McDonald draws attention to the possibility that gentrification 
may increase crime, at least temporarily, by widening the gap in neighborhood economic 
inequality, disrupting social ties in cohesive neighborhoods, and creating conflicts based 
on friction between neighborhood residents of differing socio-economic, racial-ethnic, 
and cultural backgrounds.  
Taylor and Covington (1988) find that changes in stability and status have a 
positive impact on murder and aggravated assault in gentrifying Baltimore neighborhoods 
between 1970 and 1980. In support of social disorganization theory, they find that 
stability change is more strongly related to violence than status change, though both have 
important implications for neighborhood crime rates. In a later examination of property 
offenses in Baltimore, Covington and Taylor (1989) find that gentrifying neighborhoods 
have significantly higher rates of larceny and robbery and lower rates of burglary than 
other appreciating neighborhoods, again highlighting the role of social disorganization 
and rapid population change in examinations of neighborhood processes such as 
gentrification. 
A number of studies outside of criminology – particularly in economics and urban 
studies – have examined the relationship between different types of investment and 
crime. Using a two-stage random effects estimation, Bowes (2007) finds that retail 
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development in Atlanta, Georgia census tracts between 1991 and 1994 increases reported 
crime (per spatial unit), particularly property crime. In the second stage, however, he 
finds that violent crime repels retail development. Thus, it is likely that crime and 
development have a complex relationship with one another that is concealed in single 
equation models that report single coefficients. 
Related studies have examined the impact that Business Improvement Districts 
(BIDs) have in curbing crime. Business Improvement Districts are “self-organizing, local 
public-private organizations that collect assessments and invest in local-area service 
provisions and activities, such as place promotion, street cleaning, and public safety 
(MacDonald et al., 2009: p xiii). Research about the efficacy of BIDs is mixed. For 
example, MacDonald et al. (2009) detail the relationship between BIDs and youth 
exposure to violence and crime in Los Angeles. Though they do not find that there is any 
difference in youth exposure to violence between BID and comparable non-BID 
neighborhoods, they find that BIDs reduce overall violent crime rates and this is 
particularly dramatic for robbery offenses. In addition, they find that violent crimes 
tended to drop after BIDs were adopted. The specific mechanisms by which BIDs may 
reduce crime include reduced disorder and increased security and informal social control. 
Hoyt (2005) finds that BIDs and surrounding areas are less likely to have criminal 
activity than non-BIDs. 
 Other studies have examined the relationship between investment in 
infrastructure and transit and crime. Ihlanfeldt (2003) analyzes the impact of transit lines 
on crime in Atlanta and DeKalb county census tracts between 1991 and 1994 using both 
fixed and random effects models. Access to rail transportation significantly affects crime 
 
 16 
and this nonlinear relationship is moderated by median income. As median income 
increases, the relationship between investment and crime becomes negative. Further, 
crime is increased by rail access in neighborhoods that are both close to the poor and not 
high-income. Thus, transit lines may generate crime by increasing the mobility of 
potential offenders, but it may also have the effect of reducing crime by providing 
increased economic development in surrounding areas. 
Finally, a number of studies have examined the relationship between different 
types of public housing investment and neighborhood crime. Bursik (1989) finds that 
public housing construction was associated with subsequent neighborhood instability in 
Chicago neighborhoods. Suresh and Vito (2007) find that revitalization and removal of 
public housing in Louisville reduces the concentration of aggravated assaults, but leads to 
their dispersion in other areas of the city. This suggests the importance of policy 
interventions outside of criminal justice in eliminating hot spots of crime, but also the 
potential pitfalls of displacement. 
Taken altogether, the prior literature does not offer a clear picture of how local 
economic development will affect crime. While all of the aforementioned theoretical 
explanations are possible, it is not feasible to adjudicate between them without better 
sources of data than have been utilized in prior research. Much like gentrification, 
investment may influence crime through multiple mechanisms such as population 
composition, land use patterns, disorder, and overall social organization (or 
disorganization) of a neighborhood. This research provides a first step in this analysis by 
undertaking a descriptive summary of neighborhood investment in Washington, DC and 
an aggregate analysis of the relationship between neighborhood investment and crime. 
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The final component will be a descriptive examination of neighborhood clusters that have 
experienced change since 2000. 
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Chapter 3:  Data and Methods 
 
Hypotheses 
 In the following analysis, I expect that investment will be significantly related to 
crime. Given that there are many potential pathways by which investment might affect 
crime, I refrain from making definitive statements about the direction of the relationship. 
The nature of this analysis is exploratory, therefore results should be interpreted with 
caution. Below I outline some of the potential relationships between investment and 
crime, as well as the importance and limitations of disaggregating both investment and 
crime. In general, I expect that investment will affect crime through three primary 
mechanisms.  
First, investment may affect crime by altering the physical environment of the 
neighborhood. Proponents of the broken windows thesis argue that physical and social 
disorder has a direct, positive effect on crime (Wilson and Kelling, 1982). Provided the 
broken windows thesis is accurate, higher amounts of investment should lead to fewer 
instances of crime because areas that receive considerable investment are likely to 
experience reductions in physical and social disorder. Broken windows, for example, are 
likely to be repaired if buildings are renovated. Investment should be accompanied by an 
increase in neighborhood stake-holders – such as property owners, business owners, and 
residents – who may be more likely to invoke a response from formal agencies – such as 
police or planning departments – to reduce disorder. Stakeholders may have greater direct 
access (for example, by political connections, Business Improvement Districts), indirect 
 
 19 
access (for example, through resources such as knowledge), or incentive (i.e. property 
values) to reduce disorder than original residents. 
Second, investment may affect crime by altering the land use patterns of the 
neighborhood. Increased retail investment may attract more pedestrian and vehicular 
traffic. Infrastructural investment – such as investment in roads and public 
transportation– may also bring more people to an area. These alterations in the use of the 
neighborhood will affect routine activities and as a consequence may facilitate the 
convergence of motivated offenders and attractive targets (Sherman, Gartin, and Guerger, 
1989). On the other hand, bringing more people to an area – particularly residents and 
business owners, who are likely to be more invested in keeping the area safe – may 
increase capable guardians by increasing the amount of “eyes on the street” (Jacobs, 
1961). An additional benefit of increased investment is the potential for providing jobs 
for neighborhood residents. 
Finally, investment may affect crime by altering who resides in the neighborhood. 
It is not clear if investment is necessarily followed by population turnover; however, a net 
increase in housing units may, at the very least, attract new residents, even if it does not 
displace current residents. Changes in the crime rate may be a product of this 
demographic effect. If increased residential investment attracts more crime prone 
residents then crime is likely to go up; if investment attracts less crime-prone residents 
then crime is likely to go down. Residents are likely to be attracted to or repelled by an 
area for a number of reasons, all of which may function as intervening mechanisms. 
Factors such as property and rental values, the types of amenities available, and 
demographic make-up of residents may all alter the character of the neighborhood and, as 
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a consequence, the types of people who select to move to or from the area. In turn, these 
people may have a greater or lesser likelihood of committing crimes or of reporting 
crimes to the police. Crime may also be affected if a rapid influx of new residents 
disrupts social networks that foster collective efficacy in the neighborhood. Crime may 
initially go up after areas undergo significant population change before resuming to 
average or below average levels. Yet, some social networks may actually foster social 
disorganization and crime, so the influx of new residents may have a negative effect on 
crime (Sampson, 2006). Another consequence of neighborhood change may result if 
investment generates conflict between old and new residents. 
As expected, the theoretical picture of the relationship between investment and 
crime is not obvious. These mechanisms will likely depend on both the type of 
investment and crime under consideration. Criminal events include a broad array of 
offenses that may have different causal mechanisms. Certain features of the environment 
may either generate or inhibit different types of criminal events (Felson and Cohen, 
1980). Thus, it is possible that violent crimes, such as homicide, rape, aggravated assault, 
and robbery, have different ecological precedents than property crimes such as larceny-
theft, burglary, auto-vehicle theft, and arson (Lawrence, 1995). For this reason, I examine 
the different impacts of investment on violent versus property crimes. Investment is a 
broad category as well and includes a wide range of projects that could have different 
causal impacts on crime. The types of projects included in the analysis range from 
industrial to residential to educational. Different consequences may follow different types 
of investment. For example, residential investment could lead to a population increase or 
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a population change whereas infrastructural investment might make areas more 
accessible (or residents more mobile). 
Many different relationships are possible depending on the type of investment, 
crime, and mechanism hypothesized. If investment affects crime by reducing physical 
disorder, then we should expect any kind of investment, so long as it has the effect of 
reducing disorder, to reduce crime. In general, investment – whether it is renovation or a 
new construction – is likely to convey that an area is orderly, monitored, and under 
control. If investment affects crime through land use and routine activities, a more 
complicated picture emerges. Investment of all kinds may increase attractive targets – 
specifically residential, hospitality, industrial and retail investment may increase potential 
burglaries, robberies, or larceny and motor-vehicle thefts – but it may be coupled with an 
increase in capable guardians. Some types of investment may increase the supply of 
motivated offenders by affecting opportunity – infrastructural investment may increase 
access to a particular area. Finally, residential investment is likely to have an effect on all 
types of crime. Of the eight types of investment included in the analysis, I expect the 
relationship between residential investment and crime to be the strongest and most 
consistently linked to crime. If residential investment is negatively related to crime then it 
is more reasonable to expect support for the demographic, population change argument 
given that residential investment could lead to displacement of crime-prone residents. If 
the opposite is true and investment and crime are positively linked, it is more reasonable 
to expect support for a social disorganization argument – that rapid social change brought 




Given that the rate of violence has remained relatively stable throughout the time 
series under investigation, and that violent crimes may be more susceptible to individual-
level situational factors (e.g. personal disputes) rather than aggregate-level features of the 
environment6, I expect that investment and violent crime will have a less consistent 
relationship. 
Though I expect that investment has an influence on crime, the following analysis 
makes use of observational data that does not permit conclusions about causality. There 
are a number of reasons why this is so. Investment is neither evenly nor randomly 
distributed. Instead, local economic development is likely to be influenced by a number 
of factors, such as the value of the land and the support of local officials and residents. 
Many community level factors – including the crime rate of an area – are likely to have 
some direct or indirect influence on where investment projects occur. Because of this, the 
direction of the relationship (positive or negative) and causal ordering is not entirely 
clear. Both relationships are likely and the current data do not make it possible to 
disentangle them. In addition to these limitations, the study is unable to account for any 
intervening mechanisms in the analysis or include additional variables to control for 
alternative explanations. To sum, the goals of this study are modest; the analysis will be 
primarily descriptive rather than explanatory in nature, focusing on the relationship 
between investment and crime rather than any causal effect of investment and crime. The 
analysis will provide a foundation for future research that – given more rigorous methods 
                                               
6 Some theorists have posited that individual level situational factors may have a greater influence on 
violent crime than situational opportunities. Consider Clarke (1997:9): “Crimes of sex and violence have 
been regarded as less amenable to situational controls because they are less common and less likely to 
cluster in time and space (Heal and Laycock, 1986; Gabor, 1990).” However, as Sherman (1995:44) notes, 
“to the extent that place features enhance the ability of offenders to commit some crimes, but not any 
crime, in theory, places should display some specialization.” 
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and available data – can make stronger assertions about the nature of the relationship 
between investment and crime. 
Data 
 These hypotheses will be tested utilizing existing data from two sources. The 
Washington, DC Economic Partnership (WDCEP) provides information on the primary 
independent variable – investment – and Neighborhood Info DC (a partnership between 
the Urban Institute and the Washington, DC Local Initiatives Support Corporation) 
provides information on the outcome variable – violent, property, and total crime rates. In 
addition, this dataset provides information on multiple indicators of disadvantage that 
will be scaled and included as a control variable in the analysis. WDCEP is a non-profit 
organization that provides resources and information to the business and planning 
community of Washington, DC. Since 2001, WDCEP has maintained a data-base of 
projects of various sorts that cost at least one million dollars. By tracking large-scale 
development projects in the District, the WDCEP provides data on the trends, location, 
make-up, and amount of investment activity within the city. The project-based dataset 
includes relevant information on each project, including name, project cost, land cost, 
major use, date in which the project was delivered, and physical address. The project 
based data-set was converted into a panel data-set (i.e. data that combine units of space 
and time) by first identifying where and within which spatial unit each project was 
located using ArcGIS and then aggregating investment for each space-time unit. 
 Neighborhood Info DC is a public source that provides data on a number of 
community level indices at various levels of aggregation (e.g. census tracts, police 
service areas, neighborhood clusters) for the District of Columbia. The data are collected 
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and compiled by the Urban Institute from a multitude of sources, such as the US Census, 
public loan data, and Washington, DC’s Metropolitan Police Department, Department of 
Health, and Department of Human Services. Indicators of crime, socio-demographic 
composition, poverty levels, and housing are included in the data-set on either a yearly or  
decennial basis. 
 
Measurement and variables 
The outcome variable in this analysis is reported crime rate (per 1,000) and is 
measured as the number of reported crimes divided by the population of the 
neighborhood cluster according to the 2000 Census. The data come from the 
Metropolitan Police Department and are compiled by the Urban Institute into two 
categories – violent and property – that are consistent with the FBI’s Part I Index Crimes. 
The crime rate is lagged by one year in order to establish a sequential time ordering 
between the independent and dependent variables; thus, investment is measured annually 
between 2001 and 2006 and crime is measured annually between 2002 and 2007. 
Multiple models will be estimated with three different crime rates: total, property, and 
violent. It is important to note that there are several known problems with utilizing 
official police data7 instead of self report or victimization data (for example, see Mosher, 
Miethe, and Phillips, 2002; Kirk, 2006), however there are practical challenges to using 
                                               
7 Like many other police departments, the recording practices of Washington, DC’s Metropolitan Police 
Department have been highly criticized (e.g. see McCabe, 2009). In order to check the validity of the data, 
bivariate correlations were inspected using data from the 2000 U.S. Census. Violent crime is highly 
correlated with the percent below the poverty line (correlations range from .76 to .82) and percent of 
female-headed households (correlations range from .79 to .82), which is consistent with prior literature 
(Sampson and Lauritsen, 1994). In addition, correlation matrices were inspected for each year’s crime rate 
between 2002 and 2007. All bivariate correlations are above .99 for violent and property crime and 
between .93 and .99 for total crime. 
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alternative measures given the unavailability of other measures of crime at the 
neighborhood level. Future research should address these limitations by utilizing 
additional measures of crime. 
The primary independent variable in this analysis is economic investment and is 
measured as the total amount of investment in millions of dollars per cluster-year. 
Investment is limited to large scale projects – those over 1 million dollars – that affect the 
built environment. For example, projects may be new construction of a retail business or 
renovation of an existing office building. Investment covers a broad array of uses – from 
residential to retail, office to infrastructure – and may be publicly or privately financed8. 
The investment is a sum of the project and land costs from all completed projects in a 
neighborhood cluster that are delivered in a given year. These include “hard and soft 
costs” associated with the project according to building permit data or estimates based on 
historical data (Washington, DC Economic Partnership, 2008). The delivery date is when 
the project is scheduled for completion and is determined by the date the first certificate 
of occupancy is issued or a date supplied by a primary or secondary source9. 
The analysis includes eight categories of investment based on the major use of the 
projects: education, hospitality, industrial, infrastructure, mixed-use, office, residential, 
and retail. Though specific definitions are not available, examples of projects within each 
category provide some insight into what each entails. Education projects include 
hospitals, universities, and primary/secondary education – both public and private – as 
well as affiliated athletic and arts centers. Hospitality projects include recreation centers, 
religious institutions, hotels, and museums. Industrial projects include storage facilities 
                                               
8 More information can be found at http://www.wdcep.com. 
9 Unfortunately, the code-book does not provide a more specific definition of these sources. 
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and a distribution warehouse. Infrastructure projects consist of metrorail stations, 
garages, and street widening and rehabilitation. Mixed-use projects include buildings with 
multiple uses, such as residential, retail, and office. Office projects include office 
buildings as well as organizational headquarters, such as the Greater Washington Urban 
League and Human Rights Campaign. Residential projects include apartment and 
condominium buildings, as well as assisted and senior living facilities. Finally, retail 
projects comprise a number of establishments such as a Giant grocery store or 
McDonald’s food chain.  
Projects were selected from the original WDCEP database based on several 
criteria. First, while the full database includes 1,068 projects, the present analysis is 
restricted to those that have been completed (N=586) as opposed to planned, proposed, or 
under construction10. In addition, only investment for years 2001 through 2006 are 
included in the present analysis. Though the WDCEP database includes investment 
projects for 2007, there is no data on the crime rate for 2008 that is comparable to earlier 
years in the time series. This eliminates 108 projects totaling 4.35 billion dollars. Finally, 
a number of projects were located in a “non-cluster” area. Non-cluster areas are spread 
through-out the city and include locations such as the National Mall, Walter Reed Army 
Medical Center, the National Arboretum, and the United States Soldiers and Airmens 
Home (an example of a project in the non-cluster area is the renovation of the National 
Archives). This eliminates 22 projects totaling 1.09 billion dollars. The final number of 
                                               
10 Reinvestment and redevelopment may provide unique opportunities for crime. For example, areas 
undergoing building booms have been associated with thefts of appliances and other valuable materials 
from sites undergoing construction and renovation (Clarke and Goldstein, 2003). Future research would 
benefit from an examination of projects in the early stages of construction.  
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projects is 523 and amounts to 16.65 billion dollars worth of investment in the District as 
a whole. 
Given that there is considerable variation in the types of projects included in the 
WDCEP database, overall investment will be disaggregated according to the major use of 
the project. Projects are sorted into eight mutually-exclusive categories based on the 
major use of the project: education (80), hospitality (60), industrial (3), infrastructure 
(15), mixed-use (14), office (98), residential (235), and retail (18). 
Finally, one additional independent variable11 will be included in the analysis in 
order to control for competing explanations. Disadvantage is a scale composed of four 
indicators: rates of low weight births, births to teen mothers, food stamp enrollment, and 
enrollment in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) per cluster-year. Factor 
analysis indicated strong evidence in favor of a single underlying factor with a large drop 
(to below 1.0) after the first factor. When scaled, the four items have a Cronbach’s alpha 
reliability coefficient of .879. In addition, dummy variables for each year in the analysis 
are included to control for time effects. 
 
Population and sample 
The unit of analysis in this study is the neighborhood cluster-year. A 
neighborhood cluster is a large unit of aggregation that makes up three to five contiguous 
neighborhoods whose boundaries are defined by the District of Columbia Office of 
Planning (n=39). Though selecting an appropriate unit of analysis is one of the biggest 
challenges of neighborhood research, there are theoretical, methodological, and practical 
                                               
11 A number of other variables were included in the model but had to be removed because of high 
collinearity between independent variables. 
 
 28 
considerations that shape this decision. To start, conceptualizations of neighborhood 
involve assessments beyond geographic boundaries that should be informed by both 
theory and research questions (Hipp, 2004). In addition, methodological factors affect the 
selection of an appropriate level of aggregation. Though a larger unit of analysis 
increases the likelihood that meaningful variation within the unit will be obscured, it 
reduces the possibility of spatial auto-correlation and the prospect of data thinning out, 
which can be problematic for tests of significance (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
Ultimately, the most easily accessible data for Washington, DC is aggregated at the 
neighborhood cluster12. 
For this analysis, data are available for the years 2001 through 2006. Though a 
longer time period would be preferable, the WDCEP began collecting data on investment 
projects in 2001. In fact, investment in the District is a relatively recent phenomenon 
(Urban Institute, 2008). The final number of observations for this analysis is 234 (6 years 
for each of 39 neighborhood clusters).  
There are several benefits to panel data sets. First, panel data increases the 
number of observations and therefore the statistical power of the analysis (Sayrs, 1989). 
Second, panel data allow researchers to control for both space and time effects, which 
reduce the opportunities for results to be influenced by omitted variable bias. Finally, the 
                                               
12 Crime and community-level (i.e. disadvantage) data were aggregated into a number of different units by 
the Urban Institute – including wards, advisory neighborhood commissions (ANCs), police service areas 
(PSAs), zip codes, and census tracts. Though census tracts may have been more theoretically relevant given 
that they constitute much smaller spatial areas than neighborhood clusters, aggregating both crime and 
investment (which are highly concentrated in a small number of geographic areas) to such small units 
(Washington, DC has 188 census tracts) would have “thinned out” the data and inflated standard errors, 
jeopardizing significance tests. Problems with spatial correlation are also a concern with smaller units of 
analysis. The question of what is the most relevant spatial unit is directly tied to the theory under 
consideration. Thus if the mechanism by which investment influences crime is salient at the block level, 
then this would be the most appropriate unit to assess the research question. Given that little is known about 




inclusion of temporal data points allows the researcher to better assess the issue of 
change. 
The target population of this study is urban neighborhoods undergoing 
reinvestment, however the current analysis is restricted to neighborhood change within 
one city. Rather than employ a sampling strategy (for example, by randomly selecting 
urban neighborhoods across a number of different cities), the analysis will focus on a 
population – the city of Washington, DC. The reasons for this are both practical and 
theoretical. Given that there is little uniformity in data collected on investment at the 
neighborhood level, it may not be possible to consistently measure investment in multiple 
cities. In addition, neighborhood change exists in the broader city context; thus, the 
process of neighborhood investment should be evaluated relative to changes occurring in 
the city as a whole. While the findings from this study may not be completely 
generalizable to other urban neighborhoods undergoing similar changes, the intent of this 
analysis is to shed light on the general process of investment with the hopes that 
replication in other contexts will further knowledge of this topic. Thus, future studies 
should examine the impact of investment on crime in cities other than Washington, DC. 
In addition, replications should include examinations of suburban and rural areas in order 
to determine whether findings from this study are applicable to non-urban contexts and 
whether displacement to non-urban areas is a possible consequence of reinvestment. 
 
Analytic strategy 
The research will begin with a description of overall and specific types of 
investment in Washington, DC’s neighborhood clusters between 2001 and 2006. The 
 
 30 
goal is to answer several exploratory questions in order to establish a better sense of 
which neighborhoods have received investment – measured by number of projects and 
dollar amount – and when the investment occurred. In other words, where and when is 
investment concentrated (i.e. spatially as well as temporally)? What are the 
characteristics of neighborhoods that receive investment of varying types? In order to 
answer the latter questions, I draw on available Census, as well as other community-level 
data. The descriptive analysis will be followed by an aggregate analysis of the 
relationship between crime (measured at time t) and investment (measured at t-1) 
controlling for disadvantage and time effects. The analysis will end with a descriptive 
examination of investment and crime over time in several neighborhood clusters that 
have experienced change. 
The strategy I utilize for the aggregate analysis is a pooled cross section-time 
series analysis, which is well suited for panel data. Panel data include units of both space 
and time – in this case, the cross-sectional units are neighborhood clusters which are 
measured yearly between 2001 and 2006. With panel data it is possible to analyze within 
unit change (over time) and between unit change (across space). As mentioned earlier, 
panel datasets are useful because they provide additional observations and therefore more 
degrees of freedom for statistical tests. In addition, repeated measurements of cross-
sectional units may reduce the odds of omitted variable bias given that it is possible to 
control for time effects (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). 
Several different strategies are available for analyzing panel data. The simplest 
method is to pool all the cross-section and time series data and estimate a basic ordinary 
least squares regression (OLS) model. The problems with this strategy are numerous. 
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First, it is less sophisticated because it ignores the structured or “stacked” nature of the 
data (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). Second, because cross-sectional units are measured 
repeatedly over time, it is highly probable that assumptions of serial independence will be 
violated (Stimson, 1985). Third, if heteroscedasticity is a problem, it will be exacerbated 
because it will affect multiple observations within a given unit. Fourth, the OLS 
assumption of a constant intercept and slope is overly restrictive (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 
1985); it may be unreasonable to assume that the relationship between the covariates and 
the dependent variable are the same for all cross-section and time series units (Sayrs, 
1989). Finally, misspecification about homogeneity of the dependent variable is common 
with pooled data, which can bias estimators by producing inflated variance of error terms 
(Stimson, 1985). 
There are a number of other methods available to researchers working with panel 
data that account for the limitations of the simple OLS model. The fixed-effects model 
adds dummy variables to account for variation in intercepts between units (Pindyck and 
Rubinfeld, 1998). This model assesses between-unit difference in intercepts, assuming a 
uniform slope for covariates and constant variance between groups (Park, 2008). There 
are a number of different fixed-effects models including the least squares dummy 
variable model and within-effect model, however both produce identical parameter 
estimates for covariates.  
There are many limitations to fixed-effects models. First, it is not possible to 
explain why the regression line might change between units and over time. In addition, 
fixed-effects models may use up a considerable amount of degrees of freedom, depending 
on the number of cross-sectional and time series units in the analysis. Because of this, 
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one-way fixed-effects models are used more frequently. One-way fixed-effects models 
introduce dummy variables for either cross-sectional or time series units, but not both 
(Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). Two-way fixed-effects models account for both group 
and time effects by including dummy variables for cross-section and time-series units. 
Given that the notion of change is an important part of this analysis, the number of years 
in the model is small (t=6), and the benefits of controlling for time effects are 
considerable, the two-way model is preferable to the one-way model. 
Alternatives to the fixed-effects model are the random-effects (error-components 
model) and the time-series autocorrelation models (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). The 
random-effects model assumes that differences between units affect the error term (as 
opposed to the intercepts, which is the case in the fixed-effects model). Because the 
random-effects model is more efficient (Park, 2008) it is often preferred to the fixed-
effects model. The problem with the random effects model is the assumption that the 
group and time effects within the error term are uncorrelated with the covariates. In other 
words, random-effects models are more susceptible to omitted variable bias and, as a 
consequence, biased parameter estimates (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). The time-series 
autocorrelation model assumes correlation between units of time and independence 
between cross-sectional units. This model is more focused on within unit change (i.e. 
over time) rather than between unit change. Because auto-correlation is less of a problem 
when the number of cross-section units is considerably greater than the number of time 








Chapter 4:  Results of Analysis 
 
Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 displays mean, median, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
values of each of the variables in the sample. The panel structure of the data allow for 
descriptive statistics for spatial (between) and temporal (within) units, as well as the full 
sample of cluster-years (overall). There are, on average, 15.2 violent crimes per 1,000 
people in each neighborhood cluster-year and this value ranges from a low of .5 to a high 
of 49. In general, there is much more variation in violence across the city (between 
neighborhood clusters) than over time (within neighborhood clusters). Property crime is 
much higher, with an average of slightly over 51 incidents per 1,000 residents in a year, 
and exhibits more spread and skew, ranging from a minimum of 10 crimes per 1,000 
residents to a maximum of 243 crimes per 1,000 in a year, with a median value of 44. 
Again, there is more variability between neighborhood clusters than within (over time). 
Inspection of histograms reveals that in general all three rates of crime display a fairly 
normal distribution. Figure 1 indicates that total and property crime decreased between 
2002 and 2006 and increased slightly between 2006 and 2007, whereas violent crime 
stayed relatively stable for the time series. 
The primary independent variable – total investment – is considerably more 
skewed. Overall, the average amount of investment in a cluster-year is 71 million dollars. 
The standard deviation, on the other hand, is over 188 million. Thus, the median may be a 
more reliable estimate of central tendency. For total investment, the median value is 
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almost 12 million. Notably, there is considerable within and between unit variation. 
Inspection of frequency distributions reveals that about a third of cluster-years had no 
investment (0). The remaining cluster-years have a range of 1 million to over 1.5 billion 
dollars of investment in a given year. 
Over the six year period, nearly all neighborhood clusters received some amount 
of investment13, ranging from over five million to over six billion dollars. In 2001, 2.21 
billion dollars were invested in 77 projects between the 39 neighborhood clusters, at an 
average of 53.73 million per project14. The following year there is a slight increase to 
2.47 billion dollars between 84 projects averaging around 63 million dollars each. In 
2003, the city received a nearly one billion dollar boost in investment to 3.25 billion 
dollars for 95 projects over 83 million each. In 2004, investment dropped back to the 
same level as 2002 – nearly 2.5 billion dollars for 89 projects averaging almost 64 million 
each. Investment increases slightly in 2005, but the most notable increase occurs at the 
end of the time series. In 2006, the District received almost 3.6 billion dollars of 
investment for 95 projects averaging almost 92 million dollars each. 
Total investment is broken down into the eight major use categories, which reflect 
similar degrees of variation. A simple glance at histograms (see Figure 5) reveals a 
dramatic right skew. For example, medians for all major use investment types are 0, 
though the maximums range from 8 to 900 million. In other words, at least half of all 
cluster-years receive no investment, though at least some receive investment of extreme 
proportions. Figure 2 shows the breakdown of investment by major use of the project 
between 2001 and 2006. Office development accounted for the majority of investment, 
                                               
13 Two neighborhood clusters – 16 and 29 – received no investment throughout the entire time series. 
14 These data are not reported in tabular form. 
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followed by residential, hospitality, education, mixed-use, infrastructure, retail, and 
industrial development. In general, total investment followed an upward trend between 
2001 and 2006. As mentioned previously, the data account for over 16.5 billion dollars of 
investment between 523 projects. Finally, disadvantage, much like crime, reveals a fairly 
normal distribution. 
Aggregate analysis 
 Table 2 displays a matrix of correlation coefficients for all variables included in 
the analysis. Total investment has a moderate positive correlation with both total and 
property crime (.5878 and .6275 respectively). Office investment has a slightly higher 
positive correlation with total and property crime (.623 and .6576 respectively). 
Hospitality, mixed-use, and residential investment have correlations in the .3 to .4 range. 
The remaining correlations are all below .2. 
 Disadvantage appears to have a strong relationship with the violent crime rate, but 
has a considerably smaller relationship with total and property crime. This highlights the 
possibility that there are very different etiological factors in the production of violent and 
property crime (or, at the very least, different correlates of violent and property crime). 
Unfortunately, there were few theoretically relevant control variables that might explain 
the variation in property crime. 
 Finally, I examined correlations between investment according to major use to 
address the issue of collinearity between independent variables. None of the correlations 
were high enough to warrant concern, however separate regressions were estimated for 
each type of major use investment category in order to minimize potential problems 
associated with multicollinearity. Substantively, the results were the same when the 
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independent variables were assessed in separate equations and when they were all 
included together. 
 For contrast, Figure 3 is a scatterplot of the regression of total crime on total 
investment using ordinary least squares methods. The fitted values show a strong positive 
linear relationship between total investment and total crime. The regression coefficient 
for this analysis is highly significant and indicates that each million dollar increase in 
total investment results in an increase in the total crime rate by .11. As mentioned 
previously, ordinary least squares regression is not likely to be the best method for 
analyzing panel data because of assumptions that units are independent. Thus, the 
analysis turns to the fixed effects regression, which acknowledges the panel structure of 
the data. 
 Table 3 shows the results of the fixed effects regression15. Total investment has a 
significant negative relationship with total and property crime, controlling for 
disadvantage16 and time effects. The coefficients indicate that for every million dollars of 
investment in the previous year, crime goes down by about .02. Total investment has no 
significant effect on violent crime, however. 
 Next, investment is disaggregated according to major use category. Hospitality 
and mixed-use investment have a significant negative relationship with total and property 
crime – about .02 and .06 respectively. Neither has a significant relationship with violent 
crime. 
                                               
15 Different analyses were estimated using AR1 and random effects models. There was less consistency 
amongst the different results than expected. The positive relationship for office investment and negative 
relationship for residential investment are supported for total crime, but there is less consistency for 
hospitality and mixed-use investment and for violent versus property crime. 
16 The null effect of disadvantage was unanticipated and may either be due to the high correlation with the 
dependent variable (at least, violent crime), decreased salience through out the crime drop, or an artifact of 
the specific modeling technique. Further empirical and theoretical work is needed. 
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 Third, office investment has a significant positive relationship with total crime 
and violent crime. The coefficient indicates that every one million dollars in office 
investment in the previous year, corresponds with an increase of about .02 in the total 
crime rate and .01 in the violent crime rate. This relationship is not significant when 
examining property crime. 
 Finally, residential investment has significant negative relationship with all three 
outcomes. The coefficient indicates that a one million dollar increase in investment in the 
prior year evokes a reduction in total crime of .09, a reduction in violent crime of .018, 
and a reduction in property crime of .07. 
 In sum, overall investment is negatively related to total and property crime, but 
does not have a significant relationship with violent crime. Figure 4 shows the fitted 
values of the fixed effects regression. Comparison with figure 3 highlights the importance 
of utilizing appropriate analytic methods to analyze panel data. Whereas the ordinary 
least squares regression showed a strong positive relationship between investment and 
crime, the fixed effects regression, which accounts for both spatial and temporal 
variation, indicates that the two variables are, in fact, negatively related. Closer 
examination of the scatterplots reveals that the positive relationship was likely driven by 
particular neighborhood clusters – those that may have greater amounts of investment as 
well as crime – which are measured at six different time periods, giving the impression 
that crime and investment are directly related. The fixed effects analysis adjusts for this 
by looking at the within unit change while controlling for between unit variation.  
Increases in certain kinds of investment appear to reduce crime – hospitality, 
mixed-use, and residential – and the effect appears to be strongest for property crime 
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specifically. Residential investment, though, appears to exhibit a strong negative effect on 
violent crime in addition to property crime. The exception to this is office investment, 
which exhibits a positive relationship with violent crime, but not property crime.  
 
Additional analyses 
The previous analysis highlights the relationship between investment and crime 
before and after disaggregating investment by major use and crime by broad categories – 
violent or property offenses. Additional analyses further disaggregate investment 
according to the type of construction – whether it is a new construction or a renovation of 
an old building – and the type of financing – whether public or private17. This is 
performed for each type of crime – total, violent, and property – and each major use 
category of project – total, retail, residential, industrial, infrastructural, hospitality, office, 
education, and mixed-use. This is important because other project-level factors may be 
correlated with area crime. For example, new construction projects and those that are 
privately financed may be concentrated in affluent, low crime areas, whereas renovations 
and projects that are publicly financed may be concentrated in more disadvantaged, high 
crime areas. There may be different pathways – through the changing physical 
environment, land use patterns, and residential composition – that vary according to the 
type of financing and construction. 
                                               
17 Public and private are mutually exclusive categories, but they are not exhaustive. A number of projects 
were financed through other sources of financing such as bonds and tax increment financing, and various 
combinations of different categories. Public (313) and private (73) are the two modal categories and make-
up approximately 74 percent (386) of the total projects included in the analysis and over 72 percent of total 
investment (over 12 billion dollars). For the sake of parsimony, the other categories were excluded, 
however future analyses would benefit from more in depth examinations of different sources of financing, 
particularly those that are targeted toward urban neighborhood revitalization. 
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First, investment was disaggregated into two mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
categories – new construction and renovation18. Table 4 displays the coefficients and 
standard errors for this analysis. Recall that total investment has a significant negative 
relationship with total and property crime, but not violent crime. This relationship holds 
for new construction, but not renovation. Further, disaggregating by construction type 
reveals that total investment has a significant relationship with violent crime; the 
relationship is negative for new construction and positive for renovation. The opposite 
relationships between the two types of construction concealed the significance of the 
relationship in the aggregate analysis. That the effect of renovation is positive may be 
indicative of other forces occurring in the city-wide context. For example, research has 
shown that high crime areas are characterized by structural deterioration (Schuerman and 
Kobrin, 1986). Since it is likely that renovation investment occurs in neighborhoods that 
have a greater amount of distressed buildings in need of restoration, it may be that the 
positive relationship is explained by various urban renewal programs that provide 
incentives for developers to invest in particular areas of the city. In addition, the negative 
relationship between residential investment and crime holds for private investment only. 
Private residential investment may attract new residents who are more affluent and 
therefore less likely to either commit crime or be reported/report offenses to the police. 
As a consequence, private investment may reduce crime through a compositional effect. 
If displacement of crime-prone residents occurs, then the reduction in crime should be 
even more dramatic. Three other findings are noteworthy. The positive relationship 
between office investment and crime is strongest for renovation. New construction 
                                               
18 Infrastructural investment had its own category so is excluded from this analysis. 
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hospitality investment seems to affect violent crime as well. Finally renovation mixed-use 
investment reduces total and violent crime. 
 Second, total investment is disaggregated according to the type of financing. 
Table 5 demonstrates that there are two opposite relationships between investment and 
crime. Total investment with public financing has a strong positive relationship with all 
three outcomes, whereas total investment with private financing has a moderate negative 
relationship with total and property crime. Further, residential and mixed-use investment 
has a negative relationship with all three outcomes for private investment only. Office 
investment has a positive relationship with all three outcomes for public investment only. 
Finally, private hospitality has a positive relationship with violent crime only. 
Third, in order to examine the impact of crime on investment, the panel dataset 
was reconstructed to determine how crime predicts investment. In other words, for each 
row, investment is specified as the dependent variable and is measured at year t. Crime is 
thus specified as the independent variable and is measured at t-1. Thus crime between 
2001 and 2006 is expected to predict investment between 2002 and 2007, holding 
disadvantage and time effects constant. Separate regressions are estimated for total, 
education, hospitality, industrial, infrastructure, mixed-use, office, residential, and retail 
for total, violent, and property crime (because violent and property crime may be related, 
the impact of each type was assessed in a separate equation)19. Table 6 indicates that 
violent crime significantly reduces the amount of investment in education and mixed-use 
                                               
19 Because investment is highly skewed, these variables were log transformed to resemble a normal 
distribution. First, a 1 was added to each value given that there were many values of zero in the data (which 
could not be log transformed). Second, the natural logarithm was taken for each of these values. The 
purpose of this analysis is to examine whether or not crime in one year can predict investment in the next 
year rather than to assess the specific degree of impact of crime on investment. 
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projects, total crime significantly reduces the amount of hospitality investment, and all 
types of crime reduce both residential and retail investment. 
 
Within-cluster analysis 
In the present section, I examine two neighborhood clusters over time to provide 
some contextual background for understanding the possible relationship between 
investment and crime. The selection was based on an inspection of the ranking of 
neighborhood clusters according to the overall amount of investment between 2002 and 
2007 (as well as separate rankings of residential, office, mixed-use, and hospitality 
investment), as well as rankings of crime rates by neighborhood cluster during the initial 
years of the time series. In other words, clusters that experienced a considerable amount 
of total, residential, office, hospitality, or mixed-use investment (or some combination), 
but had relatively high levels of crime (in the top half) were selected. This was done in 
order to examine relative (i.e. rank ordering) and absolute (i.e. percent change) 
differences in crime over the time series; presumably, neighborhoods that experience 
investment should have more dramatic changes in crime. First, cluster eight was selected 
because it ranks the highest regarding both investment and crime rates20. Geographically, 
this cluster is centrally located in the Northwest quadrant of DC, north of the National 
                                               
20 Because of its outlier status, the analysis was performed without cluster eight. Substantively, the results 
are very similar, though with some slight differences. On the one hand, the results are no different for total 
investment. On the other hand, many types of investment lost significance once disaggregated. Only office 
investment is significantly related to the three outcome variables once total investment is disaggregated, 
and this relationship is consistently positive. In addition, total renovation and public investment are 
significantly and positively related to all three outcomes. Finally, office investments that are publicly 
financed and renovations stand out as the most strongly related to crime, and these relationships are all 
positive. This suggests that the findings regarding residential, hospitality, and mixed-use investment may 
be more applicable to cluster eight (perhaps because only cluster eight consistently received these types of 
investments), whereas the findings regarding office investment are likely to apply to the whole city. 
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Mall. The specific parameters of cluster eight are M Street to the north, Pennsylvania 
Avenue to the south, North Capitol Street to the east, and 15th Street to the west, and it 
includes the neighborhoods of Downtown, Chinatown, Penn Quarters, Mount Vernon 
Square, and North Capitol Street. Several notable landmarks in the region include the 
Walter E. Washington Convention Center (completed in 2003) and Verizon Center 
(completed in 1997; bought and revitalized in 200621). In addition, the area is served by 
several Metro subway stops (most of which are busy hubs of transportation), has 
numerous museums, theatres, and hotels, and contains the District of Columbia City Hall, 
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other office buildings housing federal and city 
government agencies, as well as private industry, non-profit organizations, and residential 
units. 
Overall, cluster eight received the greatest amount of investment, both in terms of 
dollars, number of projects, and average cost of project. From 2001 to 2006, the area 
received over 5.7 billion dollars of investment, from 97 projects averaging 58.93 million 
dollars each. In addition, cluster eight led the rest of the city in investment in hospitality, 
mixed-use, office, and residential projects. Each year, this cluster ranked highest 
compared to the rest of the city in the amount of overall investment received. Private and 
new construction vastly outnumbered public and renovation investment and this is true 
for almost all major uses of investment that are significant in the aggregate analysis (i.e. 
hospitality, office, and residential, though not mixed-use). 
In addition to being a center of heavy investment, cluster eight has the highest 
crime rate of any other neighborhood cluster. This may be attributed to the low 
                                               




population base (8,609 in 2000) and high amount of foot traffic generated by the 
numerous retail, office and hospitality venues in the area22. Consider that the city’s 
median cluster population in 2000 of 13,179 (mean of 15,958). In 2000, cluster eight 
ranked 31st (out of 39) in terms of population size, though this is up slightly from 34th in 
1980 (population 7,587). Positive population change is noteworthy given that many 
clusters in DC have lost population over the last few decades. In general, between 2002 
and 2007, the cluster experienced a more dramatic drop than the average neighborhood 
cluster. Whereas the city’s crime drop was approximately 11 percent for overall, violent, 
and property crime, cluster eight dropped by about 23, 19.5, and 24 percents respectively. 
Whether this more dramatic decline is due to the amount of investment in the 
neighborhood cluster cannot be assessed with this particular analysis. What is notable is 
that the pattern of crime did change at a different rate than the overall city, and this 
coincided with dramatic changes in neighborhood structure. 
To contrast, cluster 39 has a population considerably higher than average, though 
it has experienced population loss since 1980. Over thirty thousand people live in this 
area (down from nearly forty thousand in 1980), which is comprised of the Congress 
Heights, Bellevue, and Washington Highlands neighborhoods. This cluster is located in 
Ward eight in the Southeast quadrant of the city, and houses some of the District’s 
poorest residents (Urban Institute, 2008). Geographically, this cluster is located in the 
southernmost tip of the city and is bordered by Southern Avenue and the state of 
Maryland to the East, the Anacostia river to the South, Interstate 295 and Bolling 
                                               
22 This is an important limitation of crime rates. There are likely to be units in the numerator that are not 
accounted for in the denominator, leading to over or under inflation of estimates. In this case, crime events 
may be experienced by individuals who are not accounted for in the residential population base (i.e. the 
denominator). In neighborhoods with high volumes of foot traffic from the non-residential population (i.e. 
workers or visitors) and a low residential population, such as cluster eight, crime rates may be over inflated. 
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Airforce Base to the West, and Alabama and 13th St. to the North. This area received over 
294 million dollars in investment and ranked 12th in total investment. Almost 90 percent 
of this (over 263 million dollars) is concentrated in residential investment; this cluster 
ranked sixth in this category compared to other clusters. Total investment is evenly split 
between new construction and renovations; however public financing outspends private 
financing by a ratio of approximately 20:1. Though new construction (versus renovation) 
accounts for more than two thirds of residential investment, public financing (versus 
private) accounts for over ninety percent of all residential investment. 
 This cluster is characterized by average to below average levels of total and 
property crime and considerably higher levels of violent crime. However, like cluster 
eight, changes have occurred over time. In 2002, there were 69 total crimes per 1,000 
residents, 26 of which were violent. Between 2002 and 2007, the total crime rate 
increased almost 20 percent. This is attributable to the nearly 42 percent increase in 
property crime. Relative to the rest of neighborhood clusters, this area increased from 25th 
to 16th in property crime rankings and 18th to 12th in total crime rankings. Violent crime 
decreased by almost eight percent in this cluster and dropped from sixth to eighth relative 
to the other clusters. Thus, this neighborhood cluster does not follow the city-wide trend 
of decreases in both violent and property crimes, nor does it follow the more dramatic 















 The previous analyses provided an initial look at the relationship between 
investment and crime in Washington, DC and several important findings emerged. First, 
investment is highly variable by neighborhood cluster. This is apparent when examining 
the wide discrepancy between two measures of central tendency – the mean and median – 
and various measures of dispersion such as range and standard deviation. Next, 
investment and crime are related, but this relationship differs according to the major use 
category of the investment and the type of crime investigated. Importantly, the source of 
financing and the construction type all affect the relationship between investment and 
crime. Finally, different processes appear to be operating in neighborhoods over time. 
The data seem to support several different hypotheses and future research that explores 
these mechanisms with greater precision will provide more insight into these 
mechanisms.  
In general, investment has a significant inverse relationship with overall and 
property crime, when controlling for disadvantage. Once both variables are 
disaggregated, the data reveal several significant relationships between investment and 
crime. Investment in hospitality, mixed-use, and residential projects all have a significant 
negative relationship with total and property crime. Investment in office projects has a 
significant direct relationship with total and violent crime. Residential investment has the 
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most robust relationship with crime and is significantly related to all three outcomes – 
total, violent, and property crime. However, these effects seem to be moderated by two 
other important factors. First, for total investment the signs of the coefficients are 
opposite depending on the source of financing and type of construction. Private 
investment and new construction has a negative effect on crime whereas public 
investment and renovation has a positive effect on crime. In addition, residential 
investment that is either privately financed or a new construction is negatively related to 
crime; however residential investment that is publicly financed or a renovation is not 
significantly related to crime. The opposite is true of office investment; the positive 
relationship between office investment only holds up for publicly financed projects and 
renovations. The exception to this is for violent crime, for which new constructions are 
positively related. The relationships for hospitality and mixed-use investment are less 
consistent. 
These results may support multiple hypotheses about the relationship between 
economic investment and crime. Overall, investment may have the effect of reducing 
crime through its impact on the physical environment, though this hypothesis is 
impossible to confirm without observation of physical or social disorder. It may also 
affect land use patterns, perhaps through the process of increased guardianship. 
Hospitality and mixed-use investment, for example, may increase the amount of foot 
traffic in the area (and, as a consequence, the amount of crime), but it may also lead to 
greater “eyes on the street,” such as those of bystanders, employees (restaurant hosts and 
servers, bouncers, valets, private security), or stakeholders (business owners, business 
improvement districts). Residential investment, too, may increase the number of 
 
 49 
stakeholders within the community who might intervene in both violent and property 
crime (though direct examination of this mechanism would necessitate survey data). 
Office investment may increase targets (e.g. daytime office employees), but without the 
attendant guardians. 
Residential investment may disrupt neighborhood social control by destabilizing 
neighborhood social ties and trust or by generating conflict between long time residents 
and newcomers, particularly if they vary in terms of socioeconomic, demographic, or 
cultural factors. Surprisingly, residential investment did not increase crime by 
destabilizing the neighborhood as might be expected from extant theory. Given that 
residential investment had a consistent and significant negative relationship with crime, it 
is likely that different mechanisms are operating. Perhaps residential investment replaces 
crime-prone residents with law-abiding residents or changes the population composition 
such that emergent properties such as collective efficacy become operable. It may also be 
that residential investment is accompanied by increased formal social control due to the 
more powerful voices of newcomers who may have more wealth or connections to 
different public agencies (i.e. investors, property owners, and residents). This hypothesis 
is indirectly supported by the finding that residential investment only reduces crime in the 
case of private investment and new construction. These types of projects may be in areas 
that are receiving more public attention as areas of redevelopment and may therefore 
have better access to crime control agencies. However, given that the data lack measures 
of population displacement, it is not possible to directly test these mechanisms. 
Office investment, on the other hand, appears to increase violent crime. This may 
be evidence of the changing land use patterns of the neighborhood. Perhaps greater 
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investment in office investment increases the number of attractive targets – white collar 
employees – without the guardianship necessary to prevent crime. Given that this 
relationship is stronger for public investment and renovation, it may be that areas that 
receive these types of office investment have fewer financial resources to hire security 
needed to deter crime. In addition, these renovations may occur in older areas of the city 
which are less a target of redevelopment interest than a function of long-needed 
infrastructural improvements. 
It is worth keeping in mind that the dependent variable is not measuring actual 
crime, but rather is a measure of reporting of crime. Thus, it may be that increases in 
violent crime associated with office investment are due to greater reporting of crime, and 
decreases in crime associated with hospitality, mixed-use, and residential investment are 
due to decreased reporting of crime. Finally, given that crime was decreasing throughout 
the city between 2002 and 2007, it may be that other factors explain the variation in 
crime and the relationship reported is spurious. It is impossible to rule out the possibility 
of omitted variable bias without controlling for more competing explanations. 
To sum, area investment and crime are significantly related, however this 
relationship is moderated by different properties of investment and types of crime. Why 
is this the case? First, why does investment show a more consistent relationship with 
property than violent crime? This may be due to the differences in the distribution and 
occurrence of violent crime. Property crime is much more prevalent; it also is less 
concentrated in disadvantaged areas. Thus increased investment in most areas may be 
accompanied by increases in guardianship and social control. Areas that are more violent 
– those that have greater levels of disadvantage - may be less affected by investment 
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because they do not experience the same levels of guardianship and social control. This 
may also explain why new and private investment are also related to crime. Altogether, 
these conclusions suggest the importance of studying mechanisms of social control and 
guardianship, as well as population change, in future examinations of investment. 
Limitations and future research 
Though the previous analysis provides insight into the relationship between local 
economic development and crime, several important methodological limitations are 
worth noting in order to guide future research. The first is related to measurement. The 
investment variable may not fully capture the construct of interest in this analysis. 
Investment is measured in dollars and only includes projects that have occurred since 
2001 that cost at least one million dollars. This leaves out smaller scale projects and 
projects that occurred in the first few years of the District’s economic boom. This 
measure also does not account for the base condition of the neighborhood. Some 
neighborhoods may not receive any investment because they are already highly 
developed. Conversely, highly developed neighborhoods may regularly receive 
investment dollars because they have more powerful stake-holders or are more desirable 
areas to invest in. If this is the case, then it is not appropriate to compare these 
neighborhoods with the aforementioned measure of investment, without somehow 
accounting for initial neighborhood differences. In addition, investment is measured as 
the sum of all projects completed in one year. If the effects of investment carry over to 
future years, then a cumulative measure may be more appropriate. Finally, investment 
only captures one type of economic investment. There are a number of modern types of 
neighborhood investment that may have an effect on crime. While block-busting and 
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redlining were important contributors to the changes in urban neighborhoods in the 
middle of the century, shifts in access to traditional and predatory home mortgage lending 
may be important drivers of change in today’s urban neighborhoods. Future research 
should explore subprime mortgage lending, tax incentive programs for residential and 
business investment, and other types of private and public financing.  
Additionally, the crime rate is subject to a number of limitations. The measure 
captures reported crime rather than the universe of criminal offenses in the neighborhood 
cluster. Summary measures of crime may also be limited in that many criminal offenses 
are vastly different from one another (e.g. robbery versus intimate partner violence) and 
have unique causal pathways at the aggregate level. In addition to the usual limitations of 
official police data the crime rate may be more suspect in neighborhoods undergoing 
significant population change. If investment has caused a change in population that 
affects community characteristics correlated with the likelihood of reporting crime, then 
any relationships uncovered in the analysis will reflect a change in the reporting of crime 
rather than actual crime. A final limitation to the crime rate is that the population base for 
all years is from the 2000 Census. If there has been considerable in or out migration per 
neighborhood cluster, the crime rates may then be under-inflated (in the case of in-
migration) or over-inflated (in the case of out-migration). 
A second issue has to do with the proper time lag, functional form, and temporal 
ordering between the two variables. The time lag utilized (one year) may not be long 
enough, such that it may take several years for investment to have an effect on the local 
crime rate. Prior research has most often used Census data that span multiple decades. If 
the process of neighborhood change takes over a decade, then the current analysis may be 
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measuring smaller, less meaningful fluctuations that are smoothed out over longer spans 
of time. The relationship also may be curvilinear, such that investment must reach a 
certain threshold before it has an effect on crime. There may be other moderating factors 
that interact with investment to affect crime. In addition, as the previous analysis 
indicated, there may be a simultaneous or reciprocal relationship between investment and 
crime. For example, crime did predict certain types of investment. Both violent and 
property crime reduced residential and retail investment. Violent crime also seemed to 
deter investment in hospitality and education. Thus, future research should use techniques 
such as two stage least squares models that assess for simultaneity to unpack these 
potentially confounding relationships. 
A third consideration is whether or not the appropriate spatial unit was utilized. 
For the most part, the unit of analysis was selected based on convenience rather than 
theoretical importance. It is important to keep in mind that the neighborhood cluster is a 
large unit – often encompassing as many as five distinct23 neighborhoods. If the 
relationship between investment and crime is more salient at the block or census tract 
level, then the use of neighborhood clusters – which constitute multiple blocks and 
census tracts – may obscure meaningful relationships. This is of specific concern if 
investment or crime is not randomly distributed across the unit of observation. For 
example, one neighborhood cluster may consist of two non-adjacent neighborhoods – one 
which receives a great deal of investment, without any change in crime, and one which 
experiences a considerable drop in crime, with no investment. The analysis would give 
the impression that investment reduced crime when, in fact, the two phenomena are 
                                               




completely independent from one another. If there is no reason to expect a diffusion 
effect across the neighborhood cluster then the results of an analysis whereby larger 
spatial units are used may not be valid. On the other hand, if investment has a 
geographically diffuse impact on crime, such that investment in one neighborhood affects 
crime around a several block radius, then neighborhood clusters may be an appropriate 
unit of observation (Hipp, 2004). The downside of this is that the analysis is more 
vulnerable to spatial correlation.  
In addition, the analysis does not include a sufficient number of variables to 
control for alternative explanations or to test important theoretical mechanisms. Sampson 
(2006) and others (Sampson and Groves, 1989), for example, have used neighborhood 
level survey data to test the relationship between structural characteristics, collective 
efficacy, and crime. Regardless of these theoretical and empirical refinements of social 
disorganization theory, much of the extant literature on neighborhood processes fails to 
account for these intervening mechanisms. Measurement of social disorganization or 
collective efficacy requires data that are not readily available in many cities – surveys of 
attitudinal and behavioral characteristics of residents; thus, most examinations of 
neighborhood change only test the relationship between structural factors and crime, and 
rely on speculations about unobserved processes to explain the process that mediates 
these relationships. This is particularly needed in the current study given the vast array of 
mechanisms that could potentially explain the relationship between investment and 
crime. 
Finally, the current analysis includes only one city – Washington, DC – which 
may not be representative of all cities undergoing urban change. For example, the city’s 
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designation as the nation’s capitol and seat of the federal government may provide a more 
favorable environment for investment and economic development than “rust belt” cities –
former centers of manufacturing that have suffered from deindustrialization and have 
been particularly hard-hit by the modern economic context. Future research should test 
the relationship between investment and crime in these other urban contexts –as well as 
suburban and rural communities. The current analysis would be strengthened by inclusion 
of spaces that are adjacent to areas undergoing reinvestment, which may experience 






Chapter 6:  Conclusion 
 
 The purpose of this analysis was to explore the phenomenon of urban 
reinvestment in hopes of gaining a better understanding of modern neighborhood 
processes and how they are related to crime. A necessary first step in answering this 
question is to examine the distribution of urban reinvestment across space and time. In 
Washington, DC, investment is highly variable by neighborhood cluster and year. There 
were few areas of the city in particular that were the beneficiaries of a considerable 
amount of investment. Further, investment increased significantly toward the end of the 
time series, though there was fluctuation between years in certain types of investment. In 
addition, the analysis showed that overall investment is related to crime, though this 
relationship is moderated by the major use, source of financing, and type of construction 
of investment, as well as the type of crime. Though the current data are unable to capture 
the particular process by which crime and investment influence one another, there may be 
several mechanisms that occur simultaneously. 
 While no specific theory is tested in this analysis, the results point to some useful 
directions for further refinement of theories of neighborhood change and crime. First, 
investment may have reduced crime by reducing disorder, though this is not necessarily 
evident from the analysis. Though total investment had a significant negative relationship 
with property crime, once investment was disaggregated, only certain kinds of investment 
remained significant. Further, many types of investment had a positive relationship with 
crime in the following year. As a consequence, alternative explanations are warranted. In 
this case, land use patterns and routine activities seem to matter. Consider the positive 
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relationship between office investment and violent crime. This relationship held for both 
new construction and renovations, but not for privately financed projects. One reason this 
may be the case is because privately financed projects are more likely to have the 
resources to hire private security or establish Business Improvement Districts. Finally, 
results regarding residential investment seem supportive of the social composition 
argument. Specifically, residential investment had a negative relationship with both 
violent and property crime, but this is only true for new construction and private 
financing. This is aptly demonstrated in the descriptive analysis. For example, cluster 39 
received a considerable amount of public residential investment, but experienced 
significant increases in property crime both in absolute and relative terms. Cluster eight, 
on the other hand, received over 917 millions dollars of private residential investment and 
less than 1.5 million dollars of investment in public residential investment, yet 
experienced more dramatic reductions in both violent and property crime than the city. 
This provides mixed support for the argument that change necessarily increases crime; it 
may also be important to consider the nature of change and the specific impacts on 
population that occur under conditions of different types of investment. Data from the 
2010 Census should provide important insights into this question by permitting additional 
analyses of change24.  
 Prior evidence has shown that rapid change may disrupt important neighborhood 
level mechanisms of social control, leaving neighborhoods, their residents, and their 
visitors vulnerable to crime. The results of this analysis show less support for this idea. 
                                               
24 The next Census should aid researchers in estimating reasonable population counts on an annual basis or 
allow analyses of inter-Census change (i.e. change scores between 2000 and 2010. In addition, the Census 
Bureau has forecasted the collection of annual data on smaller geographic units (such as census tracts) 
beginning after 2010. 
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Instead, investment appears to reduce crime – though it is not clear if this is because of 
guardianship or population displacement.  
 However, investment did not uniformly reduce crime. In some cases – such as 
public and renovation investment - it had no effect, and in other cases – such as office 
investment - it had a positive effect. Though economic development is often touted as 
beneficial to the general region (Washington, DC Economic Partnership, 2008), it is 
important to consider these and other potential costs to communities that may be incurred 
by investment and its consequences. For example, displacement and access to affordable 
housing and rentals are particularly likely consequences for communities experiencing 
increased attention by investors and city planners. Even if investment does reduce crime 
in neighborhoods that are targeted for redevelopment, while still preserving equal access 
and affordability, it may have the effect of pushing crime to more vulnerable areas that 
have fewer resources and protective factors to insulate residents and visitors from crime. 
Future research will benefit from expanding this analysis to other data sources, measures, 
and contexts. In the meantime, this analysis has provided a first step in understanding the 






Table 1: Summary Statistics: Overall, N = 234, Between, n = 39, Within, t = 6 
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
66.221 60 37.937 10.7 289 
    36.793 13.333 221.333 
Total Crime Rate     10.701 31.888 133.888 
15.2 15 9.437 0.5 49 
    9.192 0.667 39.333 
Violent Crime Rate     2.526 5.2 28.2 
51.021 44 30.976 10 243 
    29.844 12.667 182 
Property Crime Rate     9.378 22.021 112.021 
71.153 11.966 188.453 0 1612.115 
    171.318 0 1035.503 
Total Investment     82.427 -484.135 647.764 
6.981 0 21.284 0 188 
    12.887 0 71.4 
Education Investment     17.044 -64.418 157.631 
10.204 0 63.752 0 900 
    38.031 0 232.338 
Hospitality Investment     51.469 -222.134 677.866 
0.047 0 0.542 0 8 
    0.219 0 1.333 
Industrial Investment     0.497 -1.286 6.714 
2.056 0 14.465 0 187 
    6.295 0 32.5 
Infrastructure Investment     13.056 -30.444 156.555 
5.111 0 32.748 0 394 
    21.378 0 123.5 
Mixed-Use Investment     25.003 -118.389 275.611 
25.759 0 100.785 0 903.222 
    86.018 0 501.455 
Office Investment     54.011 -405.496 427.527 
20.296 0 44.619 0 371.541 
    32.25 0 156.778 
Residential Investment     31.194 -136.482 235.059 
0.705 0 4.426 0 47 
    2.254 0 11.833 
Retail Investment     3.823 -11.128 35.872 
12.566 10.724 8.805 0.641 32.606 
    8.824 1.597 29.71 
Disadvantage Scale     1.154 7.891 15.477 
Crime rate is per 1,000 
Investment is in millions of dollars 
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Table 2: Correlation Matrix 






Investment Education Hospitality Industrial Infrastructure Mixed-Use Office Residential Retail 
Total Crime 1                       
Violent Crime 0.793 1                     
Property Crime 0.982 0.665 1                   
Total Investment 0.588 0.303 0.627 1                 
Education -0.033 -0.143 0.003 0.255 1               
Hospitality 0.324 0.164 0.346 0.732 0.022 1             
Industrial 0.024 0.009 0.026 -0.015 -0.017 -0.015 1           
Infrastructure 0.014 0.011 0.014 0.078 -0.028 0.007 0.131 1         
Mixed-Use 0.343 0.187 0.363 0.501 0.219 0.327 -0.013 -0.021 1       
Office 0.623 0.346 0.658 0.843 0.095 0.417 -0.023 0.001 0.207 1     
Residential 0.345 0.183 0.367 0.704 0.174 0.404 -0.024 0.016 0.292 0.481 1   
Retail 0.092 -0.018 0.119 0.186 0.385 0.022 -0.003 0.005 0.537 0.016 0.053 1 





Table 3: Results of Fixed Effects Regression of Crime on Investment 
 
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime 
Coefficient  SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
  Total Investment 
Intercept 63.245 7.087  11.890 1.911  51.355 6.300 
Total Investment -.024*** .007  -.003 .002  -.021*** .007 
Disadvantage  .308 .544  .229 .147   .079 .483 
2001  7.552*** 2.151  1.791*** .580  5.761 ** 1.912 
2002  9.931*** 2.151  2.222*** .580   7.709*** 1.912 
2003  -.575 2.152   -.175 .580   -.399 1.905 
2004  -4.762** 2.143  .411 .578  -5.174** 1.905 
2005  -7.438*** 2.141  -.531 .577   -6.907*** 1.903 
 By Major Use 
Intercept  64.103 6.614 11.906 1.86  52.197 6.013 
Education  -.012  .037 -.000  .011   -.011 .034 
Hospitality  -.025* .012  -.003 .003  -.022* .011 
Industrial  .785 1.170  .229 .329  .555 1.064 
Infrastructure  -.032 .045  -.008 .012   -.024 .040 
Mixed-Use  -.063* .033  -.008 .009  -.060* .030 
Office  .026* .014  .010** .004  .017 .013 
Residential  -.091*** .019  -.018*** .005  -.073*** .018 
Retail  .179 .188  -.004 .053  .183 .171 
Disadvantage  .248 .505  .225 .142  .023 .459 
2001  6.674*** 2.00  1.64** .564  5.033** 1.822 
2002  9.165*** 2.022  2.112*** .569  7.053*** 1.838 
2003  -.365 2.027  -.058 .570  -.307 1.843 
2004  -4.076* 2.01 .645 .564  -4.721** 1.825 
2005  -6.974*** 1.976  -.443 .556  -6.531*** 1.797 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  (two tailed test) 
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Table 4: Results of Fixed Effects Regression of Crime on Investment by Major Use and 
Construction Type25 
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
  New Construction 
Total  Investment -0.042*** 0.009 -0.007** 0.002 -0.035*** 0.008 
Education  -0.024 0.038 -0.003 0.010 -0.021 0.034 
Hospitality -0.045*** 0.012 -0.008** 0.003 -0.037*** 0.011 
Industrial  0.453 1.345 0.160 0.355 0.293 1.196 
Infrastructure  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Mixed-Use  -0.037 0.023 -0.008 0.006 -0.028 0.021 
Office 0.022 0.014 0.006* 0.003 0.015 0.012 
Residential  -0.111*** 0.023 -0.022*** 0.006 -0.089*** 0.021 
Retail  0.017 0.2 -0.014 0.053 0.032 0.177 
  Renovation 
Total Investment 0.021 0.019 0.011** 0.005 0.010 0.017 
Education  -0.043 0.141 0.000 0.037 -0.043 0.125 
Hospitality  0.01 0.039 0.012 0.010 -0.003 0.034 
Industrial  3.989 7.650 0.010 2.022 3.978 6.799 
Infrastructure  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Mixed-Use  -0.285*** 0.065 -0.038* 0.018 -0.248 0.058 
Office  0.207*** 0.034 0.045*** 0.009 0.162*** 0.031 
Residential  -0.043 0.038 -0.001 0.010 -0.042 0.034 
Retail  -0.254 0.327 -0.079 0.086 -0.175 0.291 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  (two tailed test) 
 
                                               
25 All models include disadvantage and time effects. 
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Table 5: Results of Fixed Effects Regression of Crime on Investment by Major Use and 
Source of Financing26 
Total Crime Violent Crime Property Crime 
Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
  Private 
Total Investment -0.018* 0.01 -0.001 0.003 -0.0167* 0.009 
Education  0.022 0.087 -0.004 0.023 0.026 0.077 
Hospitality 0.021 0.047 0.021* 0.012 -0.001 0.042 
Industrial  3.989 7.650 0.010 2.022 3.978 6.799 
Infrastructure  -0.153 0.346 0.004 0.091 -0.157 0.307 
Mixed-Use  -0.131*** 0.042 -0.022* 0.011 -0.109** 0.038 
Office 0.016 0.014 0.004 0.004 0.012 0.012 
Residential  -0.107*** 0.021 -0.017** 0.006 -0.09*** 0.019 
Retail  -0.012 0.185 -0.008 0.049 -0.004 0.164 
  Public 
Total Investment 0.09** 0.032 0.021** 0.008 0.068** 0.029 
Education  0.090 0.128 -0.004 0.034 0.095 0.113 
Hospitality  0.067 0.512 0.0615 0.135 0.006 0.455 
Industrial  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Infrastructure  -0.036 0.055 0.001 0.015 -0.037 0.049 
Mixed-Use  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
Office  0.197*** 0.044 0.046*** 0.012 0.151*** 0.039 
Residential  -0.056 0.162 -0.024 0.0423 -0.032 0.144 
Retail  N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  (two tailed test) 
                                               
26 All models include disadvantage and time effects. 
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Table 6: Results of Fixed Effects Regression of Investment on Crime by Type27 
Total Investment Education Hospitality 
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Total Crime -0.001 0.007 -0.004 0.006 -0.010* 0.005 
Violent  -0.026 0.039 -0.058* 0.033 -0.031 0.028 
Property  -0.000 0.008 -0.003 0.007 -0.011 0.006 
  
Industrial Infrastructure Mixed-Use 
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Total Crime -0.000 0.001 0.000 0.004 -0.005 0.003 
Violent  -0.002 0.004 0.006 0.02 -0.042** 0.018 
Property  0.000 0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.004 0.004 
  
Office Residential Retail 
  Coefficient SE Coefficient SE Coefficient SE 
Total Crime 0.006 0.005 -0.02** 0.007 -0.007* 0.002 
Violent  0.041 0.026 -0.080** 0.038 -0.028** 0.013 
Property  0.006 0.005 -0.021** 0.008 -0.007* 0.003 
*p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001  (two tailed test) 
 
 
                                               
27 All models include disadvantage and time effects. 
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Figure 1: Crime by Type, Washington, DC, 2002-2007 


































Figure 2: Investment by Major Use, Washington, DC, 2001-2006 




























































































Table 7: Washington, DC Neighborhood Clusters 
 
Cluster Neighborhood Names 
 1 Kalorama Heights, Adams Morgan, Lanier Heights 
 2 Columbia Heights, Mt. Pleasant, Pleasant Plains, Park View 
 3 Howard University, Le Droit Park, Cardozo/Shaw 
 4 Georgetown, Burleith/Hillandale 
 5 West End, Foggy Bottom, GWU 
 6 Dupont Circle, Connecticut Avenue/K Street 
 7 Shaw, Logan Circle 
 8 Downtown, Chinatown, Penn Quarters, Mount Vernon Square, North Capitol Street 
 9 Southwest Employment Area, Southwest/Waterfront, Fort McNair, Buzzard Point 
 10 Hawthorne, Barnaby Woods, Chevy Chase 
 11 Friendship Heights, American University Park, Tenleytown 
 12 North Cleveland Park, Forest Hills, Van Ness 
 13 Spring Valley, Palisades, Wesley Heights, Foxhall Crescent, Foxhall Village, Georgetown Reservoir 
 14 Cathedral Heights, McLean Gardens, Glover Park 
 15 Cleveland Park, Woodley Park, Massachusetts Avenue Heights, Woodland-Normanstone Terrace 
 16 Colonial Village, Shepherd Park, North Portal Estates 
 17 Takoma, Brightwood, Manor Park 
 18 Brightwood Park, Crestwood, Petworth 
 19 Lamont Riggs, Queens Chapel, Fort Totten, Pleasant Hill 
 20 North Michigan Park, Michigan Park, University Heights 
 21 Edgewood, Bloomingdale, Truxton Circle, Eckington 
 22 Brookland, Brentwood, Langdon 
 23 Ivy City, Arboretum, Trinidad, Carver Langston 
 24 Woodridge, Fort Lincoln, Gateway 
 25 Union Station, Stanton Park, Kingman Park 
 26 Capitol Hill, Lincoln Park 
 27 Near Southeast, Navy Yard 
 28 Historic Anacostia 
 29 Eastland Gardens, Kenilworth 
 30 Mayfair, Hillbrook, Mahaning Heights 
 31 Deanwood, Burrville, Grant Park, Lincoln Heights, Fairmont Heights 
 32 River Terrace, Benning, Greenway, Dupont Park 
 33 Capitol View, Marshall Heights, Benning Heights 
 34 Twining, Fairlawn, Randle Highlands, Penn Branch, Fort Davis Park, Fort Dupont 
 35 Fairfax Village, Naylor Gardens, Hillcrest, Summit Park 
 36 Woodland/Fort Stanton, Garfield Heights, Knox Hill 
 37 Sheridan, Barry Farm, Buena Vista 
 38 Douglas, Shipley Terrace 
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